Mid-October saw the return of protests to the streets of Bangkok.

Combined World Bank and IMF meetings were held at the Queen Sirikit National Convention Centre with Ratchadaphisek Road closed for two days to restrict protestors' access to the venue.

A collection of protest groups marched the streets of Bangkok to either end of the closed road. There were scuffles when police objected to protestors unfurling a banner on an overhead walkway at the Rama 4 intersection but otherwise the protests were peaceful.

Interestingly, some of the protesters claimed that the Thai Government should sue the IMF for reparations over their involvement in the aftermath of the 1997 Tom Yum Kung financial crisis in Thailand.

The Thai Government floated the Thai Baht on 2 July 1997, after attempts to defend the currency against an outflow of capital and currency speculators had depleted the country’s foreign exchange reserves.

The IMF subsequently organised a $US 17.2 billion multilateral rescue package to enable Thailand to fund the gap in its balance of payments and rebuild its depleted foreign currency reserves. As part of the rescue package, Thailand agreed to implement certain austerity reforms, including raising VAT from 7% to 10%, Budget cuts and financial sector reforms.

There is general consensus that some of the IMF-led reforms created a far deeper recession in Thailand. However, the claim that $17.2 billion went to save foreign creditors and investors is not particularly accurate.

In the second half of 1997, foreign creditors were largely ignored by the Thai Government. I spent numerous evenings in the business centre of the Oriental Hotel in Bangkok with the Global Head of Impaired Assets for a foreign bank and representatives of IFC writing polite yet firm letters to the Minister of Finance offering assistance.

At times, draft legislation issued by the Government treated foreign creditors less favourably than local creditors.

As an example, promissory notes holders (mainly Thais) issued by collapsed finance companies could exchange them for a similar instrument issued by Krungthai Thanakit PCL, a still solvent state-owned finance company. Bills of exchange holders (mostly foreign institutions) were to be left to sift through the issuer's carcass for unsecured creditor scraps.

Foreign creditors of the finance companies were ultimately treated equally with Thai creditors. For some finance companies, creditors could convert their debts into NCDs. For others, creditors lined up for whatever return was available on liquidation.

In restructuring the major Thai conglomerates, there were no Government handouts to foreign creditors.

IMF reparations were not included as one of the six demands by the Assembly of the Poor and allied anti-IMF/World Bank protesters.

Coming Back To The Scene Of The Crime

November 2026

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